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Exploring the Use of ‘Third Countries’ in Proliferation Networks: the 
case of Malaysia  
Dr. Daniel Salisbury, Centre for Science ad Security Studies, King’s College London 
 
Abstract: ‘Third countries’ are frequently exploited by those involved in networks to 
transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies, allowing procurement agents to obscure the 
end user or vendor located in the proliferating state, and to deceive industry, export 
licensing officials and intelligence services. While ‘third countries’ frequently feature in 
illicit transactions, the academic literature exploring the roles played by entities in these 
jurisdictions is limited. Building on the sanctions busting literature, this paper proposes a 
loose typology considering the ways in which third countries can be exploited by 
proliferation networks. The typology is illustrated using three cases involving entities based 
in Malaysia – AQ Khan’s nuclear black market network, and Iran and North Korea’s efforts 
to procure and market WMD-related and military goods. These cases are used to generate 
insights into proliferators’ selection of ‘third country’ hubs. The paper argues that while 
exploitation of third countries by proliferation networks is a similar, but distinct 
phenomenon to trade-based sanctions busting, hubs of both activities share characteristics. 
Furthermore, the paper argues that other factors beyond the lax regulatory environment, 
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such as level of development, and personal connections, are often as important in driving 
the decisions of proliferation networks. The paper concludes with implications for 
nonproliferation policy.  
 
 
Keywords: proliferation; arms embargoes; sanctions; illicit networks; Malaysia;  
 
 
‘Third countries’ are frequently exploited by those involved in networks to transfer 
proliferation-sensitive technologies. This allows procurement agents to obscure the end 
user or vendor located in the proliferating state, and to avoid arousing suspicions of 
industry, export licensing officials and intelligence services. While ‘third countries’ have 
frequently featured in illicit transactions, the academic literature exploring the roles played 
by entities in these jurisdictions is limited. This paper uses an in-depth case study of 
Malaysia, a country having frequently played a role in these networks, to provide insights 
into ‘third country’ selection by procurement agents or arms traffickers. Rather than 
seeking to single out Malaysia, the paper uses the country –one of a number that have 
prominently played a ‘third country’ role in proliferation networks– to explore how these 
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countries are used by these networks, and the behavior of individuals and entities of which 
they are composed.  
 
Building on the literature on economic sanctions busting, the paper presents a loose 
typology of the ways these networks use third countries, and the illustrates its applicability 
using three detailed case studies involving Malaysia-based entities: AQ Khan’s nuclear 
black market network, and Iran and North Korea’s efforts to procure and market WMD-
related and military goods. In doing so, the paper considers what factors are involved in 
how proliferators select ‘third country’ hubs. The conventional wisdom suggests that 
Malaysia and other jurisdictions such as the UAE have featured prominently in these 
networks because of weak export controls, regulation and oversight. The paper compares 
proliferation networks’ exploitation of third country hubs to Early’s discussion of their use 
in trade-based sanctions busting.1 It is argued that while distinct phenomena –notably trade-
based sanctions busting focuses on volume of trade, while small, high-value transactions 
can make a big difference in proliferation networks– third country hubs in proliferation 
networks share some characteristics as hubs of trade-based sanctions busting. The cases 
explored in the paper also suggest that factors beyond the lax regulatory environment, such 
                                                     
1 Bryan Early, Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail (CA, US: Stanford University 
Press, 2015) 
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as the level of development, and personal connections, are often as important in driving the 
decisions of proliferation networks. The paper concludes by considering implications for 
nonproliferation policy. 
 
 
1. Nonproliferation, Strategic Trade Controls and ‘Third Countries’  
 
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century efforts have increasingly been made to 
prevent the proliferation of WMD – nuclear, chemical and biological weapons – and their 
means of delivery. As these efforts have seen a reduced number of governments willing to 
provide WMD-related technologies to other states, proliferators have increasingly turned to 
the international marketplace to obtain technology for their weapons programs. As the main 
supplier states have put in place export control systems in order to minimize the risk of 
diversion of exports to WMD programs, those seeking to procure WMD-related 
technologies have increasingly used illicit procurement networks and techniques to obtain 
controlled technologies.  
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Recent nuclear and missile proliferation cases – Iran and North Korea – have seen 
multilateral sanctions imposed against them by the UN Security Council, as well as 
unilateral sanctions imposed by various states. These complex sanctions regimes have 
included technology and arms embargos, travel-bans and asset freezes imposed on those 
directly associated with the weapons programs. The most recent North Korea resolutions 
have also imposed sanctions on sectors of the North Korean economy.  
 
The rationale behind these technology-based sanctions on nuclear and missile programs –so 
called ‘supply-side’ measures– has been to prevent Iran and North Korea from obtaining 
requisite technologies, to slow the programs’ development and to raise their costs. Under 
UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) countries have been legally 
mandated to put in place export controls and other systems, in theory allowing them to 
implement sanctions, although UNSCR 1540 implementation has been very patchy in 
practice.  
 
Economic sanctions more broadly –including the recent sectoral elements of UN North 
Korea sanctions– have been intended to affect the ‘demand-side’, pressuring Iran and North 
Korea to halt their pursuit of nuclear technologies. The UN arms embargoes have also 
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sought to affect these countries’ will and ability to pursue nuclear weapons; arms sales have 
functioned to bolster ideological and political connections with allies, and in the case of 
North Korea, raise hard currency for its nuclear program.   
 
To circumvent export controls and breach supply-side controls, procurement agents 
working for Iran and North Korea have employed techniques to deceive intelligence 
services, export controllers, customs officials, and industry compliance officers that are 
seeking to prevent exports to WMD programs. They include, but are not limited to, use of 
front companies, falsifying documentation, and concealing or mislabeling shipments. To 
breach the UN arms embargo, North Korea has also used front companies to market its 
arms. While many of these techniques remain unchanged since the 1970s, observers have 
suggested an increasing sophistication over time as procurement networks adapt to 
expanding measures to prevent proliferation.2   
 
One of the techniques most frequently used by proliferators is placing procurement agents 
or brokers, or routing shipments, through third countries. The term ‘third countries’ or 
                                                     
2 For example, a 2017 UN report noted North Korean efforts to evade sanctions of ‘increasing in scale, scope 
and sophistication’. UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1874 (2009)’, S/2017/150, 27 February 2017.  
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‘third party state’ is used in the literature on economic sanctions to describe players that are 
not the sanctions ‘sender’ or the sanctioned or ‘target’ state.3 As used in this paper, the term 
has a similar but distinct meaning. Because some of the cases involve UN sanctions 
(universal and legally binding on all countries, which in theory means there is no ‘third 
party’) the term is used to describe countries utilized in transactions which are not the 
origin or destination of the goods being transferred. Other terms have been used in this 
manner, including hubs for ‘transshipment’ or, in cases of procurement, ‘diversion’ (where 
goods are diverted from their intended destination) and ‘turntables’ (where goods are 
imported and immediately turned-around and re-exported).4  
 
While the use of third countries for deception purposes has frequently been used in WMD 
and military goods proliferation networks, there has been little effort to conceptualize the 
role played by these jurisdictions in the scholarly or policy literatures. Explanations have 
tended to focus on third countries being selected on the basis of weak export controls and 
                                                     
3 ‘Sender’ and ‘target’ state used in Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 3rd Ed. (Washington 
DC, US: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007) p.2; Early, Busted Sanctions, p.18.  
4 See for example ‘Transshipment and Diversion: Are U.S. Trading partners Doing Enough to Prevent the 
Spread of Dangerous Technologies?’, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and 
Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, 22 July 
2010, available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg57609/html/CHRG-111hhrg57609.htm) 
accessed 17 May 2018; David Albright, Andrea Stricker and Houston Wood, ‘Future World of Illicit Nuclear 
Trade: Mitigating the Threat’, ISIS Report, 29 July 2013, available at: (http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/Full_Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf) accessed 17 May 2018.   
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enforcement. More nuanced conceptual thinking on this topic could have great value for 
our understanding of proliferation networks, and for developing proactive policies to 
counter them.  
 
 
The Proliferation Networks and Sanctions Busting Literature  
 
The existing scholarship largely falls into two different areas: Literature on the role of third 
country hubs in networks trafficking military and WMD technology has been fairly limited. 
There remains scope to further our understanding of the role of third countries by building 
on a second area of literature which is more developed: that exploring the role of third 
countries in economic sanctions busting.  
 
References to ‘third countries’ in the proliferation network literature –that focused on the 
transfer of technology, often in breach of export controls or sanctions– are generally 
cursory and made in passing.5 The literature on proliferation networks has largely focused 
                                                     
5 See for example Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, ‘Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, International Security, 29:2 (Fall 2004), p.15; David Albright, Paul 
Brannan and Andrea Scheel Stricker, ‘Detecting and Disrupting Illicit Nuclear Trade after A.Q. Khan’, 
Washington Quarterly, 33:2 (2010), p.89.  
   
 
9 
 
on the state-level, with states forming the nodes: both suppliers and recipients.6 More 
recently, some work has started to address what could be described as the ‘transactional 
level’, focusing on the role of, and interactions between, organizations, companies, and 
individuals.7  
 
This work has sought to consider why elements of the private sector –individuals and 
companies– become involved in WMD-related illicit trade, providing a frameworks 
through which key motivations of profit, political and ideological interests can be 
considered.8 However, while it is the private sector which largely provides the technology 
to proliferation networks, often the middlemen who broker these transactions, alongside the 
needs of these procurement networks, are ultimately driven by the state programs they 
supply. These ‘witting’ aspects of proliferation networks, especially the aspects based in 
third countries, have yet been fully explored in the proliferation network literature.9   
                                                     
6 Alexander Montgomery, ‘Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network’, 
International Security 30:2 (Fall 2005), pp.172-3.  
7 Daniel Salisbury, ‘Why do Entities Get Involved in Proliferation? Exploring the Criminology of Illicit 
WMD-related Trade’, Nonproliferation Review, 24:3-4 (2017), pp.297-314; Aaron Arnold, ‘A Resilience 
Framework for Understanding Illicit Nuclear Procurement Networks’, Strategic Trade Review, 3:4 (Spring 
2017), pp.3-23; Glenn Anderson, ‘Points of Deception: Exploring How Proliferators Evade Controls to 
Obtain Dual-Use Goods’, Strategic Trade Review, 2:2 (2016), pp.4-24. 
8 Salisbury, ‘Why do Entities Get Involved in Proliferation?’ 
9 For discussion of ‘witting actors’ – those aware their goods are destined for a WMD program – and 
‘unwitting actors’ – those that are not – see Ian J. Stewart and Daniel Salisbury, ‘Non-State Actors as 
Proliferators: Preventing their Involvement’, Strategic Trade Review, 2:3 (2016), pp. 5-26. 
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Hastings provides the most developed conceptual treatment of third countries, taking a 
geographical approach to the Khan network, where nodes are ‘people or organizations 
anchored in a specific piece of territory’.10 He argues that networks without state 
prerogatives or resources –such as state-owned or military transportation, or embassies– 
must ‘set up support structures that depend on advantageous economic, political, and social 
characteristics of their host countries’.11 Considering Khan’s efforts to supply Libya, 
Hastings focuses on Dubai as a key third country hub, as well as briefly considering the 
manufacturing operations in Malaysia, providing insights into selection of these hubs. 
Dubai’s ‘political and economic environment’, lax regulations on setting up companies, 
place in global transportation infrastructure, high proportion of international residents, and 
lack of government oversight; and Malaysia’s technological sophistication, lax regulation, 
and Khan’s associate’s existing social network are all cited by Hastings as factors.12   
 
Hastings valuable work is not without limitation, essentially drawing its insights from three 
interlinked networks –all involving AQ Khan and some other common actors. The Khan 
                                                     
10 Justin V. Hastings, ‘The Geography of Nuclear Proliferation Networks: the Khan Network’, 
Nonproliferation Review, 19:3 (2012), p.431. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid., p.440.  
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network, arguably the most well-known and damaging illicit non-state supplier network in 
history, is clearly an anomaly, and possibly an anachronism. As Lieggi has noted, while 
Hastings portrays lack of state resources as a limitation, in recent years networks have 
moved from reliance upon state resources to take ‘greater advantage of the globalized trade 
system’, especially through benefitting from ‘the virtual anonymity that can come with the 
use of major transshipment hubs and manufacturing locations’.13  
 
The scholarship on economic sanctions busting, generally more developed than that on 
technology embargoes, has considered the role of third countries in undermining sanctions, 
but has not been consulted in relation to proliferation networks. The term ‘black knights’ 
was coined to describe ‘powerful or wealthy countries’ that provide support to undermine 
the effects of economic sanctions.14 More recently, Early has drawn distinction between 
politically driven ‘aid-based’ and opportunistic profit-driven ‘trade-based’ sanctions 
busting, his work providing arguably the most nuanced treatment of sanctions busting to 
date. Early’s concept of trade-based sanctions busting involves the development of 
‘alternative trading relationships’ driven by profit-seeking private sector actors.15 This is 
                                                     
13 Stephanie Lieggi, ‘Correspondence: Technology, not Geography, Drives Current Nuclear Trafficking 
Decision Making’, Nonproliferation Review, 20:1 (2013) p.10.  
14 Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, p.8.  
15 Early, Busted Sanctions, pp.18-19. 
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more relevant to considering proliferation networks than ‘aid-based’ sanction busting, 
which –driven and managed by governments– has more similarity with the state-to-state 
proliferation-related transfers.16 Early’s focus on economic sanctions necessarily means that 
his work concerns third party spoiling sanctions through making up declining trade with 
large volumes of business transactions. Focus on volume, or including proliferation-related 
alongside economic sanctions busting, is seen frequently in the literature.17 While there are 
some similarities in the trade-based sanctions busting he has conceptualized –notably that 
goods tend to be sourced from the private sector and profit constituting the driver in some 
cases– the behavior of proliferation networks, in which small numbers of specialized 
transfers can make a big difference, is a different phenomenon worthy of similar nuanced 
treatment. 
 
In sum, the nascent conceptual literature on proliferation networks has only considered 
third countries in passing, while that on sanctions busting largely considers a similar but 
                                                     
16 ‘Aid-based’ sanctions busting is largely directed by governments, support could include transfers of 
‘developmental assistance, concessional loans or trade subsidies, grants, or military assistance’. Early, Busted 
Sanctions, pp.18-19. State authorized transfers undertaken using state prerogatives and resources are more 
likely, as Hastings notes, to avoid use of commercial third country hubs. Hastings, ‘The Geography of 
Nuclear Proliferation Networks’, p.431. 
17 For example, on Dubai, see Early, Busted Sanctions, pp.88-158; R.T. Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers: 
Economic Warfare, Embargo Busting, and State-Sponsored Crime (US: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2008); And on other cases see Peter Andreas, ‘Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting 
and Its Legacy’, International Studies Quarterly, 49 (2005), pp.335-360 
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separate phenomenon. Discussion has failed to systematically consider the roles that these 
jurisdictions can play, and what factors results in their selection by proliferation networks. 
This paper uses a number of in-depth case studies in a single country– Malaysia—to 
consider questions specific to the role of third countries.18 The Malaysian case presents a 
valuable opportunity for inquiry. The state has had no interest in developing WMD, and has 
a fairly small-scale but expanding defence industrial base. However, the country has seen 
significant proliferation-related activity over the past two decades through the Khan 
network, and Iranian and North Korean illicit trade, with many details about these activities 
in the public domain. Cases considered below include transfer of nuclear and missile 
technologies, as well as military goods and US origin technologies covered by the Iranian 
embargo. Emphasis has been placed on extracting data relating to individuals’ decision 
making – for example through emails quoted in court documents—when available. In some 
of the Iranian cases involving goods covered by the US embargo, the goods themselves are 
fairly benign.19 While the application of export controls can be politically and ethically 
contentious, this paper avoids discussion of these questions, focusing on the behavior and 
decisions of the networks. The significant data surrounding the cases allows for extraction 
                                                     
18 This contrasts with Hastings’s passing consideration of multiple hubs in the single, but interconnected, in 
the Khan case. Hastings, ‘The Geography of Nuclear Proliferation Networks’. 
19 For example the Iranian cases involve transfers of an ‘emergency floatation system’. 
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of data points directly relating to decision making by individuals involved in these 
networks, yielding fresh insights.  
 
 
2. Third Countries in Proliferation Networks: Roles and Rationales 
 
Given the paucity of existing conceptual scholarship on proliferation networks, this section 
presents a loose typology of the roles that third countries can play. Entities based in third 
countries can play three main roles in proliferation networks (Figure 1). This typology 
encompasses the vast majority of scenarios, and with the latter two roles –transshipment 
and brokering– being much more commonly seen than the manufacturing role.20 Each of 
these roles will be illustrated using a Malaysia-related case study in the subsequent three 
sections.   
 
Figure 1: Typology of Third Country Roles 
                                                     
20 This is a more unusual phenomenon seen in the Khan network, for example: in Malaysia (explored below); 
and in the Turkish ‘mini-hub’, where importing parts from Europe were assembled into centrifuge motors and 
frequency converters. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. 
Khan and the rise of proliferation networks: A net assessment (London, UK: Routledge, 2007), p.81. Others 
have noted the potential for such a role, for example through manufacturing operations in ‘free zones’. See 
Andrea Viski and Quentin Michel, ‘Free Trade Zones and Strategic Trade Controls’, Strategic Trade Review, 
2:3 (2016), p.28. 
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Third Country 
Role 
Definition 
Third Country 
Footprint 
Manufacturing 
Facility used to work on imported 
technology, before re-export to program of 
concern 
Medium to large 
Transshipment or 
re-export21 
Entity (individual or front company) used 
to import and re-export technologies to 
program of concern 
Small to medium 
Brokering 
(Marketing, sales 
or procurement) 
Entity (individual or front company) used 
to broker deals involving technologies 
(technology does not necessarily enter the 
jurisdiction’s customs area, or use its 
logistical hubs) 
 
                                                     
21 Transshipment occurs when goods do not enter the third country’s customs area (for example, being moved 
from ship-to-ship at a port, or briefly warehoused and repacked at a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) taking advantage 
of the definition of transshipment in the third country’s relevant legislation, typically for lesser licensing 
requirements). In re-export goods enter and exit the jurisdiction’s customs area. 
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In presenting this typology, three caveats are stated: First, the typology largely refers to 
those that knowingly decide to utilize third countries in proliferation networks, and are 
‘witting’ actors – those that understand that the goods are destined for a WMD program.22 
Second, the typology above does not include ‘transit’ – this is where goods might pass 
through the country’s ports, without being off-loaded from the ship. This is because, rather 
than being indicative of the country being utilized in a proliferation network, cases where 
goods have transited a port tell us more about global logistical routes and transportation 
networks, and cases where shipments are seized whilst in transit tell us more about 
interdiction or enforcement action.23 Third, the typology focuses on activities involving the 
movement (or planned movement) of goods, rather than also considering enabling functions 
such as financing or transportation.  
 
The three third country roles set out have different ‘footprints’– in spatial, social, legal and 
bureaucratic terms. The footprint is seen in a physical sense– manufacturing requiring a 
factory or similar facility; transshipment requiring a basic office set up, and possibly some 
kind of warehouse for larger items; and marketing or brokering requiring little more than a 
                                                     
22 For a discussion of ‘witting’ and ‘unwitting actors’ see Stewart and Salisbury, ‘Non-State Actors as 
Proliferators’. 
23 Imprecise reporting can make it difficult to make the distinction between transshipment and transit. 
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phone or internet connection.24 In this context, footprint is also used to encompass often 
observable legal, bureaucratic and social, impact of these activities. A large factory or 
warehouse involved in a proliferation network could provide significant physical evidence 
of a network’s activity. However, it also requires satisfying (or avoiding) significant legal 
and bureaucratic processes –everything from insuring imports and exports clear customs, 
employing and managing skilled labor from the local community or sourced from other 
countries, acquiring and maintaining manufacturing equipment, to paying corporate taxes.  
 
A significant legal dimension relates to whether the actor decides to legally register a 
company in the third country to undertake its activities, or whether the illusion of a 
company is used. Creating this illusion could involve using a letterhead or a website. Both 
pathways create challenges and opportunities. The barriers to establishing a legal entity 
vary between jurisdictions. The legal registration may satisfy those conducting in-depth 
due-diligence, but could also involve more information on the organization being placed 
into the public domain of benefit to investigators.  
 
                                                     
24 This article has adapted the term ‘footprint’ from the business literature, where it usually refers to physical 
space. See Jonathan Law ed. A Dictionary of Business and Management 6th Ed. (UK: OUP, 2016) 
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On the other end of the spectrum, the footprint of an individual operating as an arms broker 
could be minimal: operating alone, conducting meetings in hotel bars, carrying just a laptop 
and a phone. Individuals could, and frequently do, broker deals involving goods being 
shipped between two separate jurisdictions, with goods never passing or being transshipped 
through the country in which they are located. Footprint, as used here, does not necessarily 
imply the ability of the third country government or others to detect the proliferation-
related activity. This would depend on the network’s ability to hide its activities, and 
operational security.25 
 
The use of third countries could in theory be avoided in all three of these transactions. 
Goods could in theory be procured directly from a supplier by the country hosting the 
WMD or military program, without need for transshipment or a broker located in a third 
country;26 the function fulfilled by a third country factory could potentially be replicated in 
the destination, or more likely in the advanced supplier economy. However, the main 
rationale for the use of individuals or entities based in third countries is to deceive– to hide 
                                                     
25 For example, in the SCOPE case explored below, the number of people with full knowledge of the end use 
of the goods the factory was producing was heavily limited. See Royal Malaysia Police, ‘Press Release By 
Inspector-General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s 
Uranium Centrifuge Programme’, February 2004, available at (http://isis-online.org/uploads/iaea-
reports/documents/Malaysian_Police_Report.pdf) accessed 17 May 2018.   
26 See for example networks with state resources or prerogatives in Hastings, ‘The Geography of Nuclear 
Proliferation Networks’. 
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the ultimate end-user of goods, connections to a sanctioned country or program, or in the 
case of the factory to prevent the need to procure finished goods with clear WMD 
application.27 This avoids raising concern amongst industry and governments that would be 
triggered by direct approaches from, or attempts to license exports to, Iranian or North 
Korea-based companies. In doing so, the use of a third country adds a layer of deception by 
means of exploiting what is a normal characteristic of most international supply chains. 
 
When it comes to the selection of specific hubs, the literature on criminal networks has 
coined the term ‘jurisdictional arbitrage’ to refer to transnational criminal groups efforts to 
‘exploit the differences in national laws and regulations’.28 Countries which offer an 
environment with limited business regulation, limited enforcement activity and related 
oversight – with regard to export controls and in other respects– would clearly be 
advantageous to those seeking to avoid detection and disruption of their activities. Lack of 
political commitment on the behalf of the host government to the implementation of 
sanctions or export controls and a significant diaspora business community of the 
sanctioned country could also be advantageous. 
                                                     
27 Anderson only alludes in passing to the use of third or ‘intermediary’ countries as ‘deception points’. See 
Anderson, ‘Points of Deception’, p.8. 
28 Phil Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Networks’, in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.), Networks 
and Netwars (Santa Monica, US: RAND, 2001) p.71. 
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In the geography of illicit networks, distinction has been drawn between terrorist ‘havens’ 
offering lawlessness, and criminal ‘hubs’ providing some ‘baseline level of infrastructure 
and services’.29 The manufacturing and transshipment or re-export operations in the 
typology would clearly benefit most from those features of ‘hubs’: access to commercial 
transportation routes, secure warehousing, and in the case of a factory uninterrupted 
supplies of water and electricity, and access to skilled labor. The solo arms broker example 
would not necessarily require these features as urgently, although true ‘lawlessness’ would 
not be beneficial. The necessity of these ‘hub’ attributes is both to allow the basic functions 
of a factory, or warehousing, but also because requests for quotations for highly-advanced 
dual-use technologies originating in countries without a sufficiently developed industrial 
sector are likely to raise alarm. 
 
The subsequent three sections present detailed case studies which illustrate these three 
types of third country roles. The cases are designed both to showcase the applicability of 
the typology, and to consider why the proliferators in those cases chose particular third 
                                                     
29 Patrick Radden Keefe, ‘The Geography of Badness’, in Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (eds.), 
Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization (Washington DC, US: NDU 
Press, 2013), p.100.  
   
 
21 
 
country hubs. The cases are followed by a section which seeks to draw broader conclusions 
about the choice of Malaysia and the behavior of proliferation networks, before considering 
recommendations for policy.  
 
3. Khan, SCOPE and Malaysia  
 
In the early 2000s the scale of the proliferation activities of Pakistani nuclear weapons 
scientist AQ Khan started to become clear, although the full story regarding the Pakistani 
state’s knowledge of his activities remains unresolved. Drawing on many of the contacts 
Khan had established in procurement for Pakistan’s centrifuge enrichment program, Khan 
went on to coordinate the supply of centrifuge and other technologies to Iran, North Korea 
and Libya. The ‘Libya deal’, struck in 1997, involved the supply of a full gas centrifuge 
plant.30 Fulfilling such a large order would require a more extensive manufacturing 
capability than previous deals which mostly relied on surplus goods from Pakistan’s 
program.  
 
                                                     
30 David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (US: Free Press, 
2010) p.120.  
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Malaysia was selected by Khan’s operation to host a significant manufacturing effort. 
Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn Bhd31 (SCOPE) was used to manufacture centrifuge 
components. Four shipments were made of these components to Libya. The final of these 
shipments, which included 25,000 centrifuge parts – labelled ‘agricultural machinery’ in 
SCOPE marked crates – was shipped from Malaysia on a local ship in August 2003.32 The 
shipment was warehoused in Dubai for 48 hours before being transferred on to the BBC 
China, which was interdicted in Italy on route to Tripoli.33 This first case considers Khan’s 
manufacturing operation in Malaysia and the rationales for the establishing operations in 
this jurisdiction. 
 
The Libya deal was on a scale that hadn’t been dealt with by the network before. It would 
eventually involve the transfer of 10,000 P-2 centrifuges – each including around 100 parts 
and components – meaning the production or procurement of around 1million parts.34 The 
clear scrutiny any effort to locate new manufacturing operations in Pakistan or then 
sanctioned Libya would garner led Khan and BSA Tahir – a key figure in Khan’s network – 
                                                     
31 ‘Sdn Bhd’ indicates that the organization is a private limited company in Malaysia. 
32 Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the 
World's Most Dangerous Secrets...And How We Could Have Stopped Him (NY, USA: Twelve, 2007), p.299. 
33 Ibid. 
34 The initial deal was for 5,000 centrifuges, but later expanded to 10,000. Albright, Peddling Peril, p.122; For 
1 million figure see p.130. 
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to consider other options.35 The most complex centrifuge parts were manufactured in the a 
factory in Switzerland owned by long-time collaborators, the Tinner family, while 
production of less complicated parts was outsourced to other ‘third countries’ – Malaysia, 
alongside South Africa, Turkey and others.  
 
Accounts of the decision to establish operations in Malaysia suggest that several 
alternatives were considered. Originally, Dubai had been considered as an option– Urs 
Tinner had sought to establish a factory there but was unable to find a sufficient local 
skilled work force, and worried that work permit applications could stimulate government 
interest.36 Second, Turkey was considered, but again the lack of skilled labor proved to be a 
problem.37 A third location, South Africa, was also considered. South Africa had hosted a 
nuclear weapons program which was dismantled in the early 1990s, meaning labor 
shortages were less likely to be an issue. However, South Africa’s history as a proliferator 
meant that governments may be wary about shipments of goods such as maraging steel to 
the country.38 
 
                                                     
35 Frantz and Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist, p.235. 
36 Ibid., p.241.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p.261. 
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Malaysia was first flagged as a further option by BSA Tahir in mid-2001, with the option 
explored further in the autumn.39 Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman ran the Dubai hub, and 
had rapidly become Khan’s right-hand man.40 Tahir had several personal and professional 
links with Malaysia. In June 1998 he had married a Malaysian woman – Nazimeh Syed 
Majid, daughter of a prominent Malaysian diplomat. Khan, alongside other network 
members, attended the wedding just months after Pakistan’s first nuclear test.41 Tahir’s 
marriage meant he was eligible for permanent residency in Malaysia, although he generally 
spent most of his time in Dubai, as the Police report noted, only returning to Malaysia ‘once 
in a while, to visit his wife’s family or look for business opportunities’.42 However, by 2000 
Tahir owned an expensive building in Kuala Lumpur, and other businesses.43  
 
Tahir ‘mixed with Malaysia’s elite’ and grew close to Kamaluddin Abdullah, the son of 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.44 Badawi was a long-time Malaysian MP, and would become 
Deputy Prime Minister in 1999, and Prime Minister in 2003. Kamaluddin appointed Tahir a 
Director of his privately held investment company, Kaspadu, which controlled Scomi 
                                                     
39 Ibid., pp.261, 272. 
40 Royal Malaysia Police, ‘Press Release by Inspector-General of Police’.  
41 Albright, Peddling Peril, p.134.  
42 Royal Malaysia Police, ‘Press Release by Inspector-General of Police’. 
43 Frantz and Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist, p.261. 
44 Albright, Peddling Peril, p.134. 
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Group. Tahir’s wife was also an investor in Kaspadu, and served on its board after Tahir.45 
While clear high-level connections to the Malaysian establishment, there is no evidence 
that Kamaluddin was aware of the nuclear dimensions of Tahir’s activities.46 
 
The decision to move operations to Malaysia was allegedly precipitated by a break-in at 
one of the network’s Dubai warehouses.47 Scomi Group signed a two-year $3.43mil 
contract in December 2001, and an existing company was acquired to handle the contract 
and renamed SCOPE.48 Urs Tinner – by this point working as a CIA informant – moved to 
Malaysia to work as a consultant and help establish operations.49  
 
An existing factory at Shah Alam outside of Kuala Lumpur – now owned by SCOPE – was 
refitted and would host 30 workers. Its capability was upgraded from producing car parts 
and industrial tubing to centrifuge components.50 The upgrade, and the factory’s new 
                                                     
45 Gordon Correra, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of 
the A.Q. Khan Network (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2006), p.113. 
46 Collins and Frantz, The Nuclear Jihadist, p.109. 
47 Ibid., p.46. 
48 Albright, Peddling Peril, p.135. According to the Malaysian company registry the company became 
SCOPE from ‘Prisma Wibawa Sdn Bhd’ in December 2001.  
49 Open sources do not suggest that the network’s move was precipitated by the CIA. Albright, Peddling 
Peril, p.135. 
50 Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz, Fallout: The True Story of the CIA’s Secret War on Nuclear 
Trafficking (NY, US: Free Press, 2011), p.47. 
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operations, required the import of equipment and materials. Aerospace grade aluminum 
was provided to SCOPE by Bikar Metal Asia in Singapore, sourced from entities in four 
other countries – Germany, Russia, Slovakia and Italy.51 Machine tools were procured from 
European and Japanese suppliers.52 Those working in the factory were allegedly unaware of 
the planned nuclear end-use for the products, as Urs Tinner took special efforts to safeguard 
all relevant documentation.53  
 
The Khan case provides a starting point to consider the reasons for the exploitation of 
Malaysia by proliferators. Collins and Frantz note: ‘Khan was intrigued because Malaysia 
offered a good technical base, lax export controls, and a location far from the spies and 
customs authorities of Europe and the United States’.54 In 2004, Malaysia did not have a 
comprehensive export control system in place, and SCOPE’s activities did not break 
Malaysian law. Malaysia was also a location less likely to cause concern amongst those 
supplying technology for the SCOPE venture.    
 
                                                     
51 ‘Transactions of Scomi Precision Engineering and Bikar Metal Asia, 2001-2002’, undated, available at: 
(http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/Transactions_of_Scomi_Precision_Engineering_and_Bikar_Metal_Asia_2001_to_2002.pd
f) accessed 28 November 2017.  
52 Albright, Peddling Peril, p.135. 
53 Royal Malaysia Police, ‘Press Release by Inspector-General of Police’. 
54 Frantz and Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist, p.261-2.  
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Hastings supplements the notion of limited regulation and a sufficient technical base with 
‘a social network to ensure the operation’s success’.55 He states: ‘The choice of Malaysia 
… illustrates how Khan’s network was constrained by the need for social ties and the 
political and economic characteristics of the countries in which it operated’.56 He notes the 
centrality of Tahir in decision making, his residency status, shares in Scomi and political 
connections.57 After the BBC China interdiction, Tahir left Dubai for Kuala Lumpur, 
allegedly expecting that ‘his political connections would protect him’, while Tinner packed 
up and fled Malaysia seeking to ensure little evidence was left behind.58 These factors 
suggest the importance of personal connections and circumstances in third country 
selection.  
 
In 2004, as a product of the Khan Network and broader concerns regarding WMD 
terrorism, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1540, requiring states put in place a series 
of measures to prevent WMD proliferation – including export controls, border controls and 
other measures. In its first 1540 report, the Malaysian government noted it lacked a 
                                                     
55 Hastings, ‘The Geography of Proliferation Networks’, pp.429-50.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid., p.443. 
58 Collins and Frantz, Fallout, p.87-89; Frantz and Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist, p.335.  
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comprehensive export control law.59 New comprehensive legislation would not be put in 
place until 2010.  
 
The SCOPE case suggests the choice of Malaysia was shaped by needing a location with 
lax regulation, a lack of oversight, and a supply of skilled labor. This saw Malaysia 
considered over Dubai and Turkey (insufficient workforce) and South Africa (perceived 
oversight). However, other countries could potentially have fulfilled these criteria. Existing 
personal connections of BSA Tahir and his belief that the country could provide political 
‘cover’ played an important role in the selection of the country. 
 
 
4. Iranian Procurement Activity in Malaysia  
 
In the late 2000s Malaysia was an important transshipment hub for Iranian illicit 
procurement activity, with Iranian agents operating in the country to procure military and 
missile related goods. Leaked US State Department cables, US court documents and other 
                                                     
59 ‘Note verbale dated 26 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations 
addressed to the Chairman of the Committee’, S/AC.44/2004/(02)/35, 4 November 2004, available at: 
(https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/594/24/PDF/N0459424.pdf?OpenElement) 
accessed 28 November 2017.  
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sources allow us to piece together a picture – albeit a fragmented one – of these activities. 
Malaysia has featured prominently in studies of Iranian illicit procurement. A US 
Government Accountability Office study noted that Malaysia or Singapore was involved in 
20% of cases of Iranian illicit procurement of US origin military and dual-use goods.60 This 
was only surpassed by the UAE which was involved in around 50% of the cases.61 Another 
study presents slightly less evidence of Iranian use of Malaysia in nuclear-related illicit 
procurement.62 However, Iranian activity in Malaysia in the late 2000s saw transshipment of 
electronics of use in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and aerospace and missile 
technologies.63  
  
                                                     
60 Government Accountability Office, ‘Iran Sanctions: Complete and Timely Licensing Data Needed to 
Strengthen Enforcement of Export Restrictions’, Report Number GAO-10-375, March 2010, p.16.  
61 Ibid., p.17.  
62 3 cases in Malaysia and 2 in ‘Malaysia and Singapore’ of 122 considered – Malaysia was much less 
prominent than China (38), UAE (13), and fewer cases than the US (6), Austria (5) and Spain (4). See Ian 
Stewart & Nick Gillard, ‘Iran’s Illicit Procurement Activities: Past, Present and Future’, Project Alpha 
Report, 24 July 2015, available at: (http://projectalpha.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2015/07/20150724_-
_Iran_Illicit_trade_past_present_future_FINAL.pdf) accessed 28 November 2017. 
63 With at least two exceptions – an unnamed Malaysian firm was implicated in efforts to procure Nuclear 
Suppliers Group controlled Russian-origin neutron generators. US Secretary of State, ‘NIAG 8064: Iran Seeks 
Russian-Origin Neutron Generators through Malaysia’, Cable No. 08STATE52481_a, 16 May 2008, available 
at; (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE52481_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018. Nicholas Kaiga also 
plead guilty in a US court in 2014 of transshipping aluminum tubes (potentially of use in the manufacture of 
centrifuges) to Iran through Malaysia. US Immigration and Customs enforcement, ‘ICE deports Belgian man 
convicted in Chicago of attempting to illegally export controlled nuclear non-proliferation items ultimately 
destined for Iran’, 8 July 2015, available at: (https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-deports-belgian-man-
convicted-chicago-attempting-illegally-export-controlled) accessed 28 November 2017.  
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Following the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) 
constructed using Iranian supplied components, were used extensively and claimed many 
casualties in the resulting insurgency. From at least 2006 until 2008, entities based in 
Malaysia were involved in a global procurement network sourcing key electronic 
components used in IEDs.64 Malaysia-based, Iranian-operated, Vast Solution Sdn Bhd was 
involved in at least 12 procurements from US companies. These procurement efforts were 
linked to those of Dubai-based Mayrow General Trading Company, which had been 
operating since at least 2004. Procurement through the ‘Malaysia conspiracy’ increased 
after the efforts of Mayrow in Dubai seemed to tail off around 2006, with the Malaysian 
network gradually replacing the role of the Dubai network.65 Vast Solution utilized direct 
Iran Air flights to transfer the goods to Tehran.66  
 
In the same period, a wider network of Iranian front companies and procurement agents 
operated in Malaysia. In 2006, the UN Security Council put in place the first technology-
                                                     
64 United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, United States vs. Ali Akbar Yahya, F.N. 
Yaghmaei, Mayrow General Trading et al. 
65 David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Scheel, ‘Iranian Entities’ Illicit Military Procurement 
Networks’, ISIS Report, 12 January 2009, available from: (http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/IranMilitaryProcurement.pdf) accessed 28 November 2017.  
66 United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, United States vs. Ali Akbar Yahya, F.N. 
Yaghmaei, Mayrow General Trading et al., September 2008, pp.37, 40. All US court documents from Pacer, 
available at: (https://www.pacer.gov/) accessed 17 May 2018. 
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based sanctions on Iran’s missile program.67 At least ten entities and eight middlemen were 
operating on behalf of Iran in Malaysia during the 2008 to 2010 period.68 These entities 
also operated in close connection to at least four in neighboring Singapore.69 The US 
government noted this expanding Iranian activity in a 2008 paper on ‘proliferation trends’:  
 
Over the past several years, companies in Malaysia repeatedly have 
attempted to procure a variety of aerospace-qualified electronics from the 
U.S. and other MTCR Partner countries on behalf of military- and missile-
related end-users in Iran. It also appears such companies …are expanding 
their procurement operations, regularly using multiple cover names and 
fraudulent end-user documentation, and routing their transactions through 
additional intermediaries to conceal the ultimate destination of an export.70 
                                                     
67 UN Security Council 1737, S/RES/1737, 27 December 2006. This would be followed in 2010 by a full UN 
arms embargo. However, the overlap between goods of use in missile and aerospace programs, and broader 
US efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining US technology since the Iranian revolution, meant the US 
government expressed concern about Iranian illicit procurement much earlier. 
68 According to leaked US State Department cables – by no means a complete dataset, yet providing a 
snapshot. Only 7 of the 10 companies listed in the leaked cables were legally registered in the Malaysian 
company registry.  
69 Evidence from the cables – and United States District Court, Northern District of California, United States 
v. Majid Kakavand, April 2009, pp.9-10. 
70 MTCR refers to the Missile Technology Control Regime, a group of missile technology holding states 
which have harmonized export controls and exchange information on missile proliferation trends. US 
Secretary of State, ‘Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): Missile Proliferation Trends’, Cable No. 
09STATE98749_a, 23 September 2009, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE98749_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018. 
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These Iranian procurement networks operated in two interlinked clusters.71 The first, was a 
cluster linked to the Iran-based Farazeh Equipment Distributor Company (FEDCO), an 
Iran-based supplier of SHIG (Iran’s liquid fueled missile program) and the Iranian 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program.72 FEDCO has been described as a ‘parent’ 
company of Malaysia-based front companies Evertop Services Sdn Bhd and Elite 
Advanced Solutions Sdn Bhd.73 FEDCO also employed Malaysia-based middlemen and 
brokers, including one which was seeking a data acquisition system of use in UAVs or 
satellites from a Belgian company.74 
 
                                                     
71 Drawing on leaked cables, US court documents and other sources. There will likely have been other Iranian 
controlled entities and networks operating in Malaysia. The linkage between the two clusters is suggested in a 
cable which suggests that firms from both were both seeking the same UAV technology from a Japanese 
company – possibly working together or in competition. US Secretary of State, ‘Iranian UAV Program 
Seeking Japanese-Origin Items via Malaysian Broker (S)’, Cable No. 08STATE109147_a, 10 October 2008, 
available at: (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE109147_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018.  
72 US Secretary of State, ‘Iran’s FEDCO Continues Efforts to Procure French Connectors from German Firm 
(S)’, Cable No. 09STATE87162_a, 21 August 2009, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE87162_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018.  
73 See for example US Secretary of State, ‘(S) Malaysian-Based Supplier to Iran Seeks Crystal Oscillators 
From Swiss Firm’, Cable No. 08STATE101519_a, 23 September 2008, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE101519_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018; US Secretary of State, 
‘New Information on Iranian Procurement Network’s Efforts to Acquire German-Origin Items for Iran’s 
Ballistic Missile Program (S)’, Cable No. 09STATE19370_a, 3 March 2009, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE19370_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018.  
74 US Secretary of State, ‘Iranian Procurement Firm Continues Efforts to Purchase Belgian Data Acquisition 
Systems via Malaysia-Based Entities (S)’, Cable No. 09STATE20617_a, 5 March 2009, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE20617_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018. 
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Evertop’s main customers were Iran Electronics Industry (IEI) which manufactures a 
diverse range of military goods including missile related goods and night vision equipment, 
and Iran Communication Industries (ICI) which manufactures military communications 
equipment.75 Evertop was indicted by the US in 2009 for re-exporting 30 shipments of 
goods, largely consisting of electronic components, valued at over $1.18million.76 Analysis 
of the products procured by Evertop, and the means used – including listing a freight 
forwarder as consignee—suggest that the scheme was an opportunistic effort to procure 
lower grade goods from naïve suppliers, rather than a sophisticated effort to target 
companies with significant Internal Compliance Programs.77  
 
The activities of Evertop provide some insights into the choice of Malaysia. According to 
the Iranian nationals running Evertop, the company was a ‘just a small private company 
stablished[sic] in Malaysia for the sake of shipment purposes only’.78 When attempting to 
procure goods from US companies, they advised them that the end user was in Malaysia.79 
                                                     
75 United States District Court, Northern District of California, United States v. Majid Kakavand, April 2009, 
p.11. 
76 Ibid., p.7. 
77 Clif Burns, ‘Malaysia Fast Becoming a Diversion Destination for Exports to Iran’, ExportLawBlog, 15 
September 2009, available at: (http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/566) accessed 28 November 2017. 
78 United States District Court, Northern District of California, United States v. Majid Kakavand, April 2009,  
p.9 
79 United States District Court, Northern District of California, United States of America V. Evertop Services 
SND BHD, Amir Ghasemi, Majid Kakavand and Alex Ramzi. 2009, p.6. 
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Apparently –as in the IED case– use of direct Iran Air flights was appealing, being 
consistently requested from freight forwarders.80 Evertop also benefitted from the lax 
regulation of a Malaysian Free Trade Zone (FTZ).81 FTZs have frequently featured in 
proliferation networks presenting a number of vulnerabilities.82 
 
In 2008 Kakavand, an Evertop director, sought to establish new intermediate companies. 
Kakavand listed four generic company names in order of preference for an ‘associate’ to 
check in the registry.83  The nonchalant ‘please prepare the forms until we can sign them’ 
suggests they faced little difficulty.84 Indeed, registry data suggests Evertop was established 
with no problem by Kakavand and other Iranian procurement agents in 2005.85  
 
The second cluster featured a series of companies surrounding Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd. 
A 2009 cable alleges that Skylife and, another front company, Microset Systems Sdn Bhd 
allegedly were ‘co-located, work closely with one another, and have acted as brokers for 
                                                     
80 Ibid., pp.8, 11. 
81 Ibid, p.15.  
82 Viski and Michel, ‘Free Zones and Strategic Trade Controls’.  
83 These names were Vertex Technology Sdn Bhd; Zenith Technology Sdn Bhd; Summit Technology Sdn 
Bhd; Microsun Technology Sdn Bhd. 
84 United States District Court, Northern District of California, United States v. Majid Kakavand, April 2009, 
p.23. 
85 Data from the Malaysian corporate registry.  
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numerous Iranian entities of proliferation concern’.86 One of Skylife’s directors 
Mohammed Mahdavi was described by the US government as ‘an Iranian procurement 
agent’ and as having worked for SHIG, and Ya Mahdi Industries (an Iranian anti-tank and 
surface-to-air missile manufacturer).87 Microset allegedly worked for a middleman linked 
to Fan Pardazan and Qods, both entities linked to Iran’s UAV programme.88 Both Skylife 
and Microset also supplied Iranian military aircraft manufacturer HESA.89 
 
Enforcement cases provide insights into the operations of this aspect of the network. David 
Levick –an Australian businessman– allegedly procured goods from US companies and 
shipped them through a Malaysian company to Iran in 2007 and 2008.90 While Skylife is 
not named in the indictment, reporting suggests that Levick’s first contact with Iranian 
                                                     
86 US Secretary of State, ‘Malaysia-Based Procurement Entity Continues to Seek German-Origin Rotary 
Swaging Machine (S)’, Cable No.09STATE115166_a, 6 November 2009, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE115166_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018. The cables suggest these 
entities share an address. Searches of the Malaysian corporate registry did not reflect this. 
87 US Secretary of State, ‘Malaysian-Based Front Company for Iranian Procurement Agent Seeks U.S.-Origin 
Equipment from South Korean Firm (S)’, Cable No.09STATE104467_a, 7 October 2009, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE104467_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018.  
88 US Secretary of State, ‘Iranian UAV Program Seeking Japanese-Origin Items via Malaysian Broker (S)’, 
Cable No.08STATE109147_a, 10 October 2008, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE109147_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018.  
89 United States District Court, District of Columbia, United States of America v. Mac Aviation Group et al, 
2009. 
90 Levick was indicted in 2011, but not extradited to the US. He was declared a fugitive in 2012, likely 
because of extradition difficulties.   
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middlemen was through the company.91 The goods included gyroscopes, servo actuators, 
pressure transducers, an emergency floatation system, and a light assembly for various 
UAV, aircraft and helicopter applications.92 In this case, Iranian middlemen transferred the 
goods so that they did not enter Malaysian customs territory, with a freight forwarder 
checking them and re-exporting them in Kuala Lumpur.93  
 
In 2008 a complaint was issued against Skylife Director, Hossein Ali Khoshnevisrad, and 
his Tehran-based company Ariasa AG.94 The complaint included charges that 
Khoshnevisrad had facilitated three shipments of 17 Rolls Royce helicopter engines from 
an Irish Company Mac Aviation to Iran via a Malaysian company.95 In this case 
Khoshnevisrad used a separate front company, ‘Pennerbit Kemas Sdn Bhd’, a book trading 
company according to investigators.96 This company appears not to have been registered, 
                                                     
91 Paul Maley, ‘Sanctions? What sanctions? Aussie accused of exporting goods to Iran’, The Australian (2 
March 2012) 
92 A list is provided in the indictment: United States District Court, District of Columbia, United States of 
America v. David Levick and ICM Components, Inc., 2011, p.7. 
93 Ibid., p.13. 
94 ‘Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant, Hossein Ali Khoshnevisrad’, August 
2008. Confirmed in the Malaysian corporate registry. 
95 Ibid, p.3; United States District Court, District of Columbia, United States of America v. Mac Aviation 
Group et al., 2009.  
96 ‘Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant, Hossein Ali Khoshnevisrad’, August 
2008, p.7.  
   
 
37 
 
and was likely just a false letterhead.97 Mac Aviation also transferred other goods to Iran 
through Malaysia. Aircraft vanes – of use in jet engines – were shipped to Kuala Lumpur 
airport where they were also transferred onto a direct Iran Air flight to Tehran.98  
 
By 2009, US officials suggested ‘Malaysia was becoming the “new Dubai” for illicit 
traders’.99 Despite US pressure, the new export control legislation had been ‘floating about 
in the government, without any domestic champion or political will to push it to fruition’.100 
In April 2009 Najib Razak replaced Badawi as Prime Minister, and ‘an unlikely but 
influential champion for strategic trade controls’.101 The Strategic Trade Act (STA), passed 
in 2010, includes strong penalties for violators such as fines up to $7million or a death 
sentence for violations leading to loss of life.102  
 
                                                     
97 Data from the Malaysian corporate registry. 
98 The indictment lists the flight number as IR841 – United States District Court, District of Columbia, United 
States of America v. Mac Aviation Group et al., 2009, p.22. 
99 US Embassy Kuala Lumpur, ‘Malaysia: Special Advisor on Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert 
Einhorn’s Meeting with Senior Officials at MITI, Central Bank, and Atomic Energy Licensing Board, 
November 3-4, 2009’, Cable No.09KUALALUMPUR917_a, 13 November 2009, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KUALALUMPUR917_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018.  
100 M. S. A. Kareem, ‘Implementation and Enforcement of Strategic Trade Controls in Malaysia’, Strategic 
Trade Review, 2:2 (2016), pp.104-17.  
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid.   
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In sum, Iranian procurement activities in Malaysia –for IED, UAV and missile technology– 
were extensive. Operations in Malaysia were underway at least a year before UN 
technology-based sanctions were put in place. However, Iran had been an embargoed 
destination for US technology since after the Iranian revolution, and subject to various 
other unilateral restrictions from other developed economies. There is little direct evidence 
to suggest why Iran chose Malaysia. However, investigation of these cases provides 
suggestions beyond a basic need to obscure the end user. The lax regulatory environment 
seems to be appealing, especially around heightened concern and the tightening up of 
controls in the UAE –Iran’s most significant sanctions-busting hub– in 2007.103 Iranian 
agents could establish new companies to conduct business with relative ease. Again though, 
besides the lax regulatory environment, present in most of East Asia, other factors may 
have contributed to the choice of Malaysia specifically. Malaysia, for example, provided 
the only direct Air Iran link to Tehran in South East Asia, which all the Iranian cases above 
utilized.104  
 
                                                     
103 Karim Sadjadpour, ‘The Battle of Dubai: the United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War’, Carnegie 
Paper, July 2011, p.21, available at: (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dubai_iran.pdf) accessed 28 
November 2017.  
104 Mahan Air also flew to Bangkok. ‘Air Iran Route Map’, October 2002, available at: 
(https://web.archive.org/web/20110515085921/http://airchive.com:80/html/timetable-and-route-maps/eurasia-
middle-east/iran-air-october-27-2002/6659) accessed 28 November 2017. 
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5. North Korean Illicit Activity in Malaysia  
 
Evidence suggests that Malaysia has long been a venue for North Korean arms trading, 
although two cases unearthed in early 2017, likely involving breaches of the UN arms 
embargo in place since 2006, provide more extensive evidence.105 The activities of 
Glocom, said to be a ‘Malaysia-based company’ advertising ‘radio communications 
equipment for military and paramilitary organizations’, were featured in a 2017 UN 
report.106 Glocom is described as a ‘front company of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea company Pan Systems Pyongyang Branch’.107 Two Malaysian registered companies 
                                                     
105 A 2013 UN report suggested that British arms dealer Michael Ranger had held business meetings in 
Malaysia with North Korean dealers an unstated number of times since 2004. UN Security Council, ‘Report 
of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2013/337, 11 June 2013. US 
officials travelled to Kuala Lumpur to warn banks that North Korean arms companies had Malaysian accounts 
in 2009. US Embassy Kuala Lumpur, ‘Goldberg Delegation’s Meetings with Malaysian Central Bank and 
Financial Institutions Re Implementation of UNSCR 1874’, Cable No.09KUALALUMPUR549_a, 8 July 
2009, available at: (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KUALALUMPUR549_a.html) accessed 17 May 
2018; A 2016 UN report also listed Malaysia as one country of a handful that KOMID (Korea Mining and 
Development Trading corporation, North Korea’s primary arms dealing company) officials had travelled to 
between 2012 and 2015. UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2016/157, 24 February 2016. 
106 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2017/150, 27 February 2017. James Pearson & Roszanna Latiff, ‘North Korea spy agency runs arms 
operation out of Malaysia, U.N. says’, Reuters (26 February 2017) available at: 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-malaysia-arms-insight-idUSKBN1650YE) accessed 28 
November 2017.   
107 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2017/150, 27 February 2017, p.34. 
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(established in 2005 and 2012) acted on its behalf. The manufacturing of Glocom’s radio 
equipment appears to have taken place in North Korea, and the procurement of components 
from mainland China and Hong Kong, and export of the finished product conducted using 
intermediaries based in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.  
 
Pan Systems Pyongyang used Malaysia as a ‘base for its key representative abroad’, listing 
its website at a ‘.com.my’ URL.108 Malaysia may also have played a role as a transshipment 
or transit hub, with a shipment of radio gear being seized on route to a phantom end user in 
Thailand in 2011.109 A 2018 UN report suggested Glocom’s representative in Malaysia 
disclosed to a Malaysian bank that he intended to set up a factory in the country, although 
this was likely to justify opening an account.110 The network was active recently, with a 
new Glocom website advertising new products going live in January 2017.111 A recent 
                                                     
108 Ibid., p.35, 155. ‘.my’ is the internet country code top level domain for Malaysia.  
109 'Malaysia says intercepted North Korean arms shipment to Thailand in 2011’, Reuters (20 March 2017), 
available at: (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-malaysia-arms-idUSKBN16R11U) accessed 28 
November 2017.   
110 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2018/171, 5 March 2018, p.64. 
111 James Pearson & Roszanna Latiff, ‘North Korea spy agency runs arms operation out of Malaysia, U.N. 
says’, Reuters (26 February 2017), available from: (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-malaysia-
arms-insight-idUSKBN1650YE) accessed 28 November 2017;  
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brochure alleged that the company took $10mil annually from transactions in over 50 
markets.112 
  
A second case involves Kay Marine –a Malaysian boat builder– sanctioned by the US State 
Department in 2016.113 A 2011 Kay Marine marketing video featured a number of North 
Korean-designed military craft including torpedo boats, semi-submersible vessels and a 
Yono Class miniature submarine. Statements by the company management in 2006 and 
2007 suggest collaboration with North Korea in the 2000s, and the relationship may have 
involved the ‘manufacture of assault boats’.114 While there is evidence that Kay Marine 
marketed North Korean arms, and suggestion of possible collaboration in manufacturing, 
there is no hard evidence to suggest the vessels were manufactured in or transferred through 
Malaysia.  
 
                                                     
112 ‘Glocom and DPRK Fronts’, Armscontrolwonk podcast, 10 March 2017, available at: 
(http://hwcdn.libsyn.com/p/9/0/6/906c3bf2ff3638e1/28.mp3?c_id=14476329&destination_id=228079&expira
tion=1500073227&hwt=58d46fb71bc5104af347016a346f398c) accessed 17 May 2018.  
113 Daniel Salisbury, ‘A Malaysian Shipyard with North Korean Connections’, Armscontrolwonk, 18 May 
2017, available at: (http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203180/daniel-salisbury-a-malaysian-
shipyard-with-north-korean-connections/) accessed 28 November 2017.  
114 ‘Boatbuilder Kaymarine gets more foreign orders’, The Star Online (5 November 2006), available at: 
(http://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2006/11/05/boatbuilder-kaymarine-gets-more-foreign-
orders/#0wqmxpO2gHYx3253.99) accessed 28 November 2017; ‘Seven More Marine Dept Boats To Provide 
Services’, Bernama (March 5 2007). 
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Marketing conventional weaponry and related military equipment through entities based in 
‘third countries’ is a modus operandi of North Korean arms dealers, allowing them to avoid 
scrutiny and pass off North Korean military products as goods produced by other countries.  
The cases involved companies that were to some degree taken over or ‘controlled’, rather 
than being established, by North Korean agents. North Korea often exploits existing 
business relationships and historical trading connections. These North Korean cases may 
not have involved the breach of export controls, because no goods are known to have been 
transferred through the country, and show how a wider landscape of legislation must be put 
in place in order to implement UN sanctions.  
 
 
6. Why Malaysia? ‘Third Country’ Selection and Proliferation Network Behavior 
 
Despite great differences between the cases, they all have at least one common factor: 
individuals, or groups, decided to exploit Malaysia as a ‘third country’ for proliferation 
purposes. This is rather than Malaysia featuring by default – for example through its ports 
due to its position in global transportation networks. This section further explores themes 
addressed in the cases above –laxly regulated environments and their genesis, as well as 
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other factors such as levels of development, logistical networks and existing social and 
political connections. It argues that Malaysia shares the ‘commercial’, but not the 
‘geographical’, characteristics which Early suggests make certain third countries more 
likely to become trade-based sanctions busting hubs.115  
 
 
Weak Regulation and Enforcement 
 
A rationale which is evident in all cases discussed is the relative ease of doing business – in 
terms of export controls, other regulations, and limited oversight. Until 2010 Malaysia did 
not have a comprehensive export control system in place. Like most countries around the 
world, it has seemingly never successfully prosecuted a company or individual for breach 
of export controls.116 In the cases explored, the Malaysian government has also displayed a 
general reluctance to act against proliferators.117  
                                                     
115 Early, Busted Sanctions, pp.65-71; 77-9. 
116 Project Alpha, ‘Countries That Have Prosecuted WMD Export Control Violators’, available at: 
(https://public.tableau.com/profile/project.alpha#!/vizhome/GlobalWMDExportControlProsecutions/Dashboa
rd1) accessed 28 November 2017.   
117 Although evidence is far from complete, all three cases explored above showed signs of government 
reluctance or inability to act –from legislative overhaul taking 6 years following the Khan revelations; limited 
enforcement action taken against the Iranian networks; and lack of evidence of investigation and action after 
the US government sanctioned Kay Marine.  
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While great advances have been made in Malaysia since the SCOPE case, issues remain in 
Malaysia’s legal framework. For example, the Financial Action Task Force noted in 2015 
that, ‘Malaysia’s technical gaps in relation to TFS [targeted financial sanctions] against the 
financing of proliferation are significant’, with delay transposing new designations a source 
of concern.118 It is unclear whether current Malaysian laws are fully in line with UN North 
Korea sanctions, and therefore whether the country is equipped to deal with the recent arms 
marketing cases. Although the STA does cover brokering, it is unclear what legal basis was 
used by Malaysian authorities to act on the Glocom case.119 The 2017 collapse of the 
Chinpo Shipping trial in Singapore shows the challenges of prosecuting violations when 
domestic legislation does not exactly reflect the specific language of UN resolutions.120 
 
                                                     
118 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures Malaysia’, 
Mutual Evaluation Report, September 2015, available at: (http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Malaysia-2015.pdf) accessed 17 May 
2018.   
119 Rosana Latiff, ‘Malaysia says North Korean firms linked to arms trade being deactivated’, Reuters (27 
February 2017), available from: (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-malaysia-arms/malaysia-
says-north-korean-firms-linked-to-arms-trade-being-deactivated-idUSKBN167067?il=0) accessed 22 March 
2018.  
120 Andrea Berger, ‘The Chinpo Shipping Case Implodes’, Armscontrolwonk, 15 May 2017, available at: 
(http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203164/guest-post-the-chinpo-shipping-case-implodes/) 
accessed 28 November 2017.  
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Proliferators have likely exercised ‘jurisdictional arbitrage’ in choosing Malaysia because 
of its favorable national laws and regulations.121 The peril of lax regulation, and the logic of 
deterrence and displacement when controls are tightened, clearly has currency in the US 
government.122 The comment that Malaysia could become the ‘new Dubai’ reflects this 
logic. Dubai put in place export controls in 2007, around the time the IED smuggling 
network shifted emphasis to Malaysia. As one analyst from the policy community has 
noted, Iranian illicit procurement shifted from Dubai to Malaysia as a result of ‘greater 
scrutiny’.123 
 
The ease of establishing or registering companies also constitutes a factor contributing to 
the attractiveness of the regulatory environment, although evidence in the cases discussed is 
ambiguous. The Iranian cases seem to have involved front companies being established 
solely for re-export purposes. However, Iranian networks also involved companies which 
were not formally registered – merely letterheads.124 In the Khan and North Korean cases, 
                                                     
121 Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Networks’, p.71. 
122 For example, US representatives noted ‘Front companies and intermediaries involved in missile-related 
procurement often operate in countries with weak export control oversight and enforcement’. US Secretary of 
State, ‘Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): Missile Proliferation Trends’, Cable No. 
09STATE98749_a, 23 September 2009, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE98749_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018. 
123 Albright, Peddling Peril, p.201. 
124 It should be noted this doesn’t necessarily indicate difficulty in establishing companies.  
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companies that had already been established were utilized. In the SCOPE case the company 
already existed and was renamed. The nature of the relationship between North Korea and 
Kay Marine is unclear, as is whether the owners of Malaysian surrogate companies of 
Glocom were aware that North Korean entities were using these businesses. A 2017 World 
Bank survey suggests that Malaysia is ranked relatively poorly for ease of establishing a 
business, perhaps suggesting why the Khan and North Korean cases involved already 
existing companies.125 
 
 
Explaining the Regulatory Environment: Between Economics, Politics and Bureaucracy 
 
If a weak or favorable regulatory environment drives proliferators’ choices, what drives 
countries to develop such environments? Malaysia’s regulatory environment can be viewed 
as a result of economic, political and bureaucratic factors. Following a series of structural 
reforms in the 1970s, Malaysia experienced significant economic growth facilitated by a 
favorable regulatory environment.126 FTZs –established from 1972 onwards, and utilized in 
                                                     
125 The country was ranked 111th of 190, compared to 24th for general ease of doing business. See World 
Bank, ‘Economy Rankings’, 2017, available at: (http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings), accessed 27 
November 2017.  
126 Koen, V. et al. Malaysia’s economic success story and challenges, (Paris, OECD Publishing: 2017)  
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some of the Iranian cases above– formed a part of this.127  In the 1980s and 1990s 
Malaysian ports also saw significant growth, competing with other regional players such as 
Singapore to create the most favorable atmosphere for business.128 
 
All cases explored benefitted from a Malaysia’s desire for international business. Elements 
of the Malaysian government have also prioritized economic growth over any political 
reservations. Government led-efforts to grow Malaysia’s economic relationship with Iran 
were seen as UN technology-based sanctions were passed in 2006.129  In 2007 a Malaysian 
government Minister suggested Malaysia could help to normalize Iran’s relationship with 
the international community.130 The following year, the country sent a delegation, including 
firms showcasing potentially sensitive technologies, to an Iranian trade show led by official 
government trade body Malaysia External Trade and Development Corporation 
(MATRADE).131  
 
                                                     
127 Rajah Rasiah, ‘Free Trade Zones and Industrial Development in Malaysia’, in K. S. Jomo (ed.), 
Industrializing Malaysia: Policy, Performance, Prospects (London: Routledge, 1993). 
128 Michael Richardson, ‘Malaysia Aims to Become a Key Southeast Asian Shipping Hub: Singapore Faces a 
Rival Next Door’, New York Times (1 February 2002).  
129 UN Security Council 1737, S/RES/1737, 27 December 2006. 
130 ‘Minister: Malaysia to assist Iran in normalizing position in global community’, Bernama (8 November 
2007). 
131 For example ‘heat exchangers, pressure vessels, switchgears, electrical and electronic goods’. ‘Malaysian 
Companies Seek to Increase Exports to Iran’, Bernama (17 October 2008). 
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Around the time that Kay Marine appears to have started a relationship with North Korea – 
in the mid-2000s – the company’s Managing Director spoke positively about international 
business.132 As recently as 2016 – after the UN’s imposition of sectoral sanctions on coal 
and iron exports – elements of the Malaysian government still openly pursued a greater 
trade relationship with North Korea.133 In December 2016 the CEO of MATRADE sought 
to boost ties, stating ‘North Korea is now looking at using Malaysia as a gateway to South-
East Asian markets as it finds the country business-friendly with pro-business policies’.134  
 
Malaysia’s emphasis of disarmament over nonproliferation, and discomfort with tools such 
as sanctions and export controls may have also limited enforcement. Malaysia, it was noted 
in 2008 US government correspondence, while respecting UNSC resolutions, ‘opposes use 
of sanctions as a means of diplomacy’.135 In a statement in April 2004 debates about 
UNSCR1540, the Malaysian government suggested that the most effective way of 
preventing WMD terrorism was through nuclear disarmament, and expressed concern about 
                                                     
132 ‘Boatbuilder Kaymarine gets more foreign orders’, The Star Online (5 November 2006), available from: ( 
http://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2006/11/05/boatbuilder-kaymarine-gets-more-foreign-
orders/#0wqmxpO2gHYx3253.99) accessed 28 November 2017; 
133 UN Security Council 2270, S/RES/2270, 2 March 2016. 
134 ‘Malaysia eyes boosting trade with North Korea’, The Star (2 December 2016).  
135 US Embassy Kuala Lumpur, ‘Malaysia Scenesetter for A/S O’Brien: Financial Controls’, Cable No. 
08KUALALUMPUR213_a, 26 March 2008, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KUALALUMPUR213_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018.  
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the use of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.136  
 
While Malaysia has slowly implemented export control reform, and has shown some 
reluctance in reining in business ties with Iran and North Korea and acting against their 
proliferation networks, Malaysia’s relationship with the US has been an important 
regulating factor. For example, the government Minister speaking of normalizing relations 
with Iran in 2007 caveated it with, ‘I think Malaysia is highly aware of the limits that it can 
do. We will not do anything to jeopardize our relations with the US’.137 However, it was the 
entry into office of Najib Razak in 2009 that marked the start of a stronger and deeper 
bilateral relationship with the US.138 Razak, as discussed, passed the STA in his first 
months in office, just before attending the US-hosted 2010 Nuclear Security Summit.  
 
Limited enforcement action could also be explained by the challenges faced by the 
government bureaucracy in implementing a new export control system. These factors 
                                                     
136 Chapter VII allows the UN Security Council to place legally binding measures on all member states. 
Malaysia was speaking on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement. Rastam Mohd Isa, Statement to the UN 
Security Council, S/PV.4950 (Resumption 1), available at: 
(http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1540%20SPV%204950%20R1.pdf) accessed 28 November 2017.  
137 ‘Minister: Malaysia to assist Iran in normalizing position in global community’, Bernama (8 November 
2007).  
138 Joshua R. Johnson, ‘Cooperation and Pragmatism: Malaysian Foreign Policy under Najib’, Asia Pacific 
Bulletin, No. 63, 3 June 2010.  
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suggest that limited enforcement is a result of inability rather than unwillingness. The 
Malaysian system has been in place just a few years, for example, and as one former 
official has noted, has only a handful of staff working on implementation.139   
 
In sum, the shape of the regulatory landscape and enforcement efforts are a product of 
efforts to balance economic development, politics and security. This balance is sometimes 
regarded as a zero-sum game – that new efforts to enhance nonproliferation through 
regulation will impede economic development. Like many developing countries, Malaysia 
has traditionally been wary that an overly regulated business environment could harm 
economic development.140 US and others have sought to highlight the positive aspects of 
creating a more regulated business environment, reducing risk for investors. For example, 
in 2010 the US highlighted that Malaysia’s ‘legitimate business interests would also suffer 
if it were seen as a “proliferators' playground”.’141 
 
                                                     
139 Kareem, ‘Implementation and Enforcement of Strategic Trade Controls in Malaysia’. 
140 For example, a visiting delegation in 2000 reported: ‘Malaysia was largely dependent on its trade, and was 
afraid that a comprehensive [export] control system would run counter to its commercial interest, which were 
Malaysia’s principle source of income’. US Embassy The Hague, ‘Readout on MTCR Dutch Chair Visit to 
South East Asia’, Cable No. 00THEHAGUE1863_a, 22 June 2000, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/00THEHAGUE1863_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018.  
141 US Embassy Kuala Lumpur, AA/S Van Diepen’s Meetings in Kuala Lumpur on Non-Pro and Export 
Control Issues’, Cable No.10KUALALUMPUR68_a, 5 February 2010, available at: 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10KUALALUMPUR68_a.html) accessed 17 May 2018. 
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Explaining Network Behavior: Beyond the Regulatory Environment 
 
Malaysia’s regulatory environment has limited explanatory value alone in explaining the 
proliferation networks’ choices. Extracts of emails between procurement agents included in 
US court documents seldom refer to lax regulation.142 It is also unlikely that those involved 
in these networks take such a structured approach to considering relative merits of different 
jurisdictions.143 However, most importantly, the lax regulatory environment does not 
explain the choice of Malaysia over other relatively unregulated economies in South East 
Asia and beyond. When Malaysia put in place the STA in 2010, only Singapore out of 
ASEAN’s 10 members had put similar legislation in place.144 In terms of export controls, 
by 2010 Malaysia was actually one of the more regulated jurisdictions in the region. Other 
factors must supplement an explanation centered on a lax export control regulatory 
environment. These broader factors include features which distinguish ‘hubs’ from 
                                                     
142 The lack of concern/ awareness expressed by these entities regarding regulation may be a reason they were 
caught or had their activities uncovered; or its importance in the choice of Malaysia may be obvious to those 
involved, and therefore not explicitly stated.  
143 For a discussion of the limits of the rational actor model, see Salisbury, ‘Why do Entities Get Involved in 
Proliferation?’, pp.306-8. 
144 Stephanie Lieggi and Richard Sabatini, ‘Malaysia's Export Control Law: A Step Forward, But How Big?’, 
10 May 2010, available at: (http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/malaysias-export-control-law/) accessed 28 
November 2017.   
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‘havens’ –levels of development as reflected in the workforce, infrastructure and logistical 
connections– as well as existing social and political connections of those involved.   
 
Basing a hub in a developed and industrialized economy provides a skilled workforce and 
helps proliferators to import required technology. In the SCOPE case, Malaysia was viewed 
as having a sufficiently advanced workforce when Dubai and Turkey couldn’t deliver. Kay 
Marine clearly had something to offer North Korean arms dealers, possibly in technical or 
procurement terms during alleged collaboration on assault boats, or in terms of an untainted 
and industrializing economy which could feasibly manufacture and therefore market these 
vessels without raising suspicion.   
 
Orders for high specification products from a country with limited high-technology 
industry could raise suspicions about end uses and concern of possible transshipment risk 
amongst export controllers in government and industry in advanced economies. This factor 
likely was a consideration in the Khan and Iranian cases, which involved imports. States 
with previous nuclear aspirations could also raise concerns. For example, South Africa was 
initially discounted as an option by Khan and associates, because exports to the country 
might raise the interest of intelligence agencies. In the North Korean cases, Malaysia would 
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allow for the goods to masquerade as Malaysian. A less developed country could have been 
used to market North Korean military vessels and communications equipment, but this 
could have raised concern about quality, or because the product line was inconsistent with 
potential buyers’ perceptions of the capability of the country’s industry. 
 
Good logistical and transportation links are clearly important in proliferator’s location 
choices. Malaysia is a transshipment hub for legitimate global trade, like many other ‘third 
countries’ exploited by proliferators – for example, Dubai and the UAE, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and China. Malaysia is a part of major liner maritime shipping networks and has 
a large hub airport. Evidence of the importance of transportation links is clearer in the 
Iranian case. The three Iranian networks discussed saw goods re-exported on direct Iran Air 
flights to Tehran, making interdiction impossible once the goods left Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport, then Iran Air’s only South East Asian destination. Factors such as 
access to infrastructure and the costs and time to trade across borders have featured – 
alongside other factors relating to regulation, compliance and legal protections – in the 
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World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index.145 Malaysia has consistently performed 
relatively well globally, and in the region in this index.146  
 
While evidence of personal and political connections is lacking in the Iranian cases, there 
are clear examples in the Khan network and the North Korean cases. BSA Tahir’s 
connections – through marriage in 1998, increasing association with the Prime Minister’s 
son, and growing business interests in the country made Malaysia an obvious choice. His 
connections likely opened doors, and to an extent he believed they would protect him. In 
the North Korean cases, links to the Malaysian establishment – and that establishment 
interests have affected enforcement – should not be discounted.147 Although it is unclear 
whether money changed hands, there was clear potential for ‘corrupt protection’ of 
proliferation networks in these cases.148 
                                                     
145 The index includes categories such as ‘getting electricity’ and ‘trading across borders’, alongside ‘paying 
taxes’ and ‘enforcing contracts’. See World Bank, ‘Economy Rankings’, 2017, available at: 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings) accessed 27 November 2017. 
146 For example, in 2017 Malaysia was ranked 24th globally of 190 countries, and 4th regionally behind 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Ibid. 
147 According to the Reuters reporting above prominent member of the UMNO Malaysian ruling party was 
listed as the director of one of the companies in the Glocom case; Kay Marine had a number of contracts with 
Malaysian government bodies, including for a research vessel funded by the Prime Minister's Department's 
Economic Planning Unit. Pathama Subramaniam, ‘PAC wants graft probe on university’s ‘ailing’ research 
vessel project’, MalayMailOnline (27 October 2014), available from: 
(http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/pac-wants-graft-probe-on-universitys-ailing-research-
vessel-project) accessed 28 November 2017.  
148 Matthew Bunn, ‘Corruption and Nuclear Proliferation’ in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Corruption, Global 
Security and World Order (Washington DC, US: Brookings Institution Press, 2009) p.136.  
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In sum, while there are clear differences between Early’s concept of trade-based sanctions 
busting and the use of third countries in proliferation networks, there are also similarities in 
the characteristics of countries emerging as hubs for these activities. Specifically, as in the 
UAE example used by Early, Malaysia is an ‘open’ economy, with infrastructure to 
facilitate international trade.149 However, Malaysia’s pre-existing trade links with Iran and 
North Korea are less extensive than UAE’s links to Iran. The Malaysian case explored 
undermines the importance of geographical proximity, which Early argues was important in 
the emergence of the UAE as a sanctions-busting hub.150 That proliferation networks see 
the transfer of a small number of high-value shipments, rather than large volumes of trade, 
mean that geographical proximity and related low transportation costs are not as important 
in the emergence of third country hubs in proliferation networks. This agrees with 
arguments made in passing by Early and Naylor.151 While geography is not such an 
important factor in the selection of third country hubs in proliferation networks, trade-based 
                                                     
149 Early, Busted Sanctions, pp.68-9; 106; 122. 
150 Ibid, pp.77; 106; 122. 
151 See for example: ‘circuitous routing provided an alibi and made countermeasures more difficult’ in Naylor, 
Patriots and Profiteers, p.238; ‘the sensitive nature of such transactions increases the value of discretion 
and/or opacity provided by particular third-party venues above the logistical advantages they offer’ in Early, 
Busted Sanctions, p.102. 
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sanctions busting hubs often also see significant proliferation-related trade as well as trade 
volumes – for example the UAE in the case of Iran and China in the case of North Korea.152  
 
 
7. Conclusion: Network Behavior and Nonproliferation Policy 
 
This paper has considered the use of ‘third countries’ in proliferation networks to facilitate 
the transfer of WMD and military technologies. It has proposed a loose typology of ways 
which third countries are used in these networks –manufacturing, transshipment and 
brokering– and illustrated those using detailed case studies. In doing so, it has sought to 
provide a more nuanced conceptual grounding for discussion of proliferation networks. The 
use of a Malaysian cases has not been to single out the country –in theory any country can 
be exploited in such a way, and many have been– but to generate further insights into the 
decision-making of those involved in proliferation networks.  
 
The paper has argued that explanations involving weak regulation and limited enforcement 
                                                     
152 See Early, Busted Sanctions, p 120-2; John Park and Jim Walsh, ‘Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions 
Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences’, MIT Security Studies Program Report, August 2016, available 
at: (https://www.brookings.edu/events/stopping-north-korea-inc/) accessed 27 November 2017. 
   
 
57 
 
action need to be supplemented with other factors –social, political, bureaucratic, logistical 
and personal– to fully understand why those in illicit networks make the choices they do. 
The paper has sought to situate this question, and subsequent findings to contribute to the 
academic literature on proliferation networks and sanctions busting. Notably, it has found 
that while a different phenomenon to Early’s trade-based sanctions busting, proliferation 
networks seek out hubs which share many of the characteristics of trade-based sanctions 
busting hubs. However, beyond this, our conceptual understanding of how illicit networks 
operate at the transactional level, and their geography is still underdeveloped.153 Moving 
beyond a basic understanding of how illicit actors behave can provide an empirical basis to 
inform counter-proliferation strategies.  
 
The importance of other factors highlighted in this study suggests that conducting further 
research into the relationships between policy tools such as export controls and the illicit 
activities they are designed to counter would be useful. Considering the question as to 
whether export controls and targeted sanctions are having the effects intended by 
policymakers complements new research which has highlighted the unintended effects of 
sanctions.154 There also may be insights to gain from further exploration of the literature on 
                                                     
153 Radden Keefe, ‘The Geography of Badness’, pp.99; 107. 
154 See for example Park and Walsh, ‘North Korea Inc.’. 
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how legitimate businesses make their location choices. While data is limited, this article 
suggests it is still possible to extract insights.  
 
Findings relating to the role of weakly regulated environments, and the importance of other 
factors such as personal connections, both suggest pessimistic outlooks for policy. There 
will always be spaces with less regulation and oversight than others– despite some 
significant successes in the implementation of the UNSCR 1540 agenda. This fact, paired 
with ‘jurisdictional arbitrage’ suggests that proliferation networks will merely be displaced 
by efforts to improve export controls and other legal tools, rather than eradicated. In this 
sense, efforts to improve the implementation of supply-side controls could be viewed as 
akin to a never-ending quest. That said, improvements in national export control systems 
could clearly increase detection and prosecution of these networks, as well as contributing 
to the development of a norm against illicit WMD-related trade. 
 
On the other hand, focusing on the specific context of these networks and what drives their 
decision-making suggests that efforts to counter illicit networks should be heavily tailored. 
Although risk-based approaches to outreach are clearly important in prioritization efforts, 
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these findings highlight the limitations of indexes in considering third country risks.155 
Policy should be heavily intelligence driven and focused on disrupting illicit activity where 
prospects for deterrence is limited. More research should be conducted into unilateral 
means to disrupt these overseas networks for governments inclined to do so.156 In the most 
prominent ‘third countries’ –namely China– progress on export control implementation and 
enforcement has been slow, and hostage to bilateral diplomatic relations. Both these types 
of approaches –enhancing legal frameworks and further developing the disruptive toolset –
are undoubtedly required, and already being undertaken, by governments in their efforts to 
counter proliferation networks.  
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